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Jim Phillips, ‘Containing, Isolating and Defeating the Miners: the UK Cabinet Ministerial 
Group on Coal and the three phases of the 1984–5 Strike’, Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations, 35 (2014), 117-141 
 
The thirtieth anniversary of the start of the 1984–5 miners’ strike in Britain coincided with 
the release of various UK government archive papers under the 30-year rule. Media and 
press coverage of this release concentrated on two issues. First, Arthur Scargill, president of 
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), was broadly right when he argued before and 
during the strike that there was a secret Conservative government and National Coal Board 
(NCB) ‘hit list’, framing the closure over a three-year period of roughly seventy five pits with 
the loss of perhaps 64,000 of the industry’s 200,000 jobs. Margaret Thatcher, the Prime 
Minister, discussed this list in a meeting on 15 September 1983 with Nigel Lawson, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Energy, and Norman 
Tebbit, Secretary of State for Employment, together with various officials, yet the 
government consistently claimed in public that a much smaller programme of shrinkage, 
possibly extending only to twenty pits, was being contemplated. Second, in July 1984 the 
government examined declaring a State of Emergency to allow military personnel to move 
coal imports and other materials through the ports to break a short-lived but economically-
damaging strike by dock workers. This private discussion jarred with the government’s 
public insistence that neither the actions of the striking miners or any other group of 
unionized workers were disturbing the normalcy of economic and industrial life in Britain. 
Media analysis in 2014 of this latter and vital episode in the strike was truncated, dwelling 
on the details of troop numbers, and evading the complex industrial and political issues,1 
summarized by this author in a letter published by The Guardian. The dock workers had 
withdrawn their labour in a dispute over the handling of coal imports by British Steel 
Corporation (BSC) employees at Immingham on the Humber. This appeared to threaten the 
National Dock Labour Scheme, which provided registered dock workers with employment, 
income security, and an element of joint industrial regulation, and itself a component of the 
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 N. Higham, ‘Cabinet papers reveal “secret coal pits closure plan”’, BBC News, 3 January 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25549596; A. Travis, ‘Thatcher had secret plan to use army at height of 
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wider social-democratic legacy of the 1940s which Thatcher and her ministers were 
dismantling. Thatcher’s Secretary of State for Transport, Nicholas Ridley, pledged in the 
House of Commons that his government had no plans to abolish the Scheme. The dockers 
returned to work, although some with major misgivings, and the government’s immediate 
economic difficulties were resolved.2 The Dock Labour Scheme was abolished in 1989, by a 
Conservative administration reconstituted after the 1987 General Election, but only in this 
narrow sense had Ridley – speaking about the existing government’s plans in 1984 – not 
misled Parliament. 
 This article develops analysis of these two headline issues. With the closure 
programme it is argued that Ministers were determined to ensure that the NCB could shut 
pits unilaterally, without the agreement of the NUM and other industry unions. This marked 
a major rupture with the nationalized coal industry’s system of joint regulation and its 
related ‘moral economy’, where significant changes were reached only with the agreement 
of unions and where the economic security of coalfield communities was preserved. With 
the July episode the scale of the Prime Minister’s antipathy to the Dock Labour Scheme is 
demonstrated, along with the duplicity of her ministers in ensuring that dockers ended their 
stoppage so that the striking miners remained isolated. Huw Beynon, in a recent lecture to 
the Manchester Industrial Relations Society, argued that there were three phases to the 
strike: initial division of the coalfields, between working areas and striking areas; followed 
by a ‘face off’ between striking miners and the government; and then the long 
‘entrenchment’, with divisions in communities in all coalfields as striking miners slowly 
returned to work.3 In this analysis a three-phased model is also adopted. Initially, from 
March to May, the government sought to contain the scale of the strike and its economic 
and political effects; then, roughly from May to October, the striking miners were isolated 
from other groups of unionized workers and inhibited in their construction of broader social 
and political anti-government alliances; and thereafter Thatcher and her ministers moved to 
secure the unconditional defeat of the strikers and the NUM. These phases – or the strategic 
priorities pursued by the government within these phases – overlapped to an extent. So in 
the opening weeks the government worked to contain the strike in part by isolating the 
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3 H. Beynon, ‘The Great Miners’ Strike, 1984-5: Reflections and Legacies’, Lecture, Manchester Industrial 
Relations Society, Manchester Metropolitan University Business School, 20 March 2014. 
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miners; and in the isolation phase ministers were already working – from June onwards – to 
inflict defeat on the NUM, chiefly through the NCB’s ‘back to work’ campaign. 
The article is based on the 350-plus pages of minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial 
Group on Coal (CMGC) which were also released on 1 January.4 These provide a detailed 
record of government thinking and action. Meetings took place usually twice a week from 
the start of the strike in March until the end of October, when NACODS, the union of pit 
deputies and safety officers, agreed a revised system for consultation and agreement on pit 
closures with the NCB. This lifted the threat of a complete stoppage of work in the coalfields 
and was the government’s second and final crisis of 1984–5 after the docks episode in July. 
The CMGC met just once a week thereafter. The personnel of the Ministerial Group further 
under-lines the centrality of its work. The Prime Minister usually chaired its meetings, which 
were attended by core Cabinet figures in Walker, Lawson, Tebbit, Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry by this point, plus Ridley, Tom King, Secretary of State for Employment, 
Leon Brittan, Home Secretary, Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for Defence, and 
Michael Havers, Attorney General. George Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland, was 
either present or represented by one of his Ministers of State. Peter Dorey has pointed out 
that while each of these figures served on this Group because of ‘functional’ or 
departmental role, Lawson, Tebbit, King and Ridley were all key Thatcher supporters; 
Walker, Heseltine and Younger were not Thatcherites, but unyielding all the same in 
criticizing the NUM and the strike.5 
The general thrust of existing literature is that Thatcher and her ministers were 
determined to defeat the NUM, and covertly intervened in the strike in a number of ways.6 
This is broadly confirmed by the CMGC minutes, which show the extent of government 
micro-management in three crucial areas: NCB strategy and negotiations with the NUM and 
other industry unions, plus the ‘back to work’ campaign; the handling of related disputes, 
                                                             
4 Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal (hereafter CMGC), CAB 130/1268, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter 
TNA). 
5 P.Dorey, ‘“It was Just Like Arming to Face the Threat of Hitler in the late 1930s”. The Ridley Report and the 
Conservative Party’s Preparations for the 1984–85 Miners’ Strike’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 
(HSIR) 34 (2013), pp. 173–214. 
6 T. Brotherstone and S.Pirani, ‘Were There Alternatives? Movements from Below in the Scottish Coalfield, the 
Communist Party, and Thatcherism, 1981–1985’, Critique 36–7 (2005), pp. 99–124; A. Richards, Miners on 
Strike. Class Solidarity and Division in Britain (Berg, Oxford: 1996); R. Samuel, B. Bloomfield and G. Bonas (eds), 
The Enemies Within: Pit Villages and the Miners’ Strike of 1984–5 (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1986). 
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such as that in the docks; and the conduct of policing, ensuring that striking miners were 
prevented from mustering at power stations, steel works, and other pressure points. More 
significantly, the CMGC files also provide unambiguous evidence that the government’s 
chief goal in the strike was the removal of effective union representation from the coal 
industry, with important demonstration effects across the economy more generally. This 
was hinted at by Martin Adeney and John Lloyd, writing in 1986,7 and represented one of 
the main conclusions of Seumas Milne’s analysis of the British state’s determined campaign 
against the NUM and its leadership, originally published in 1994.8 It was also the core theme 
of Beynon’s recent Manchester lecture, but more broadly has been absent from the main 
body of literature on the strike, both contemporaneous and historical, and whether focusing 
on high politics,9 operational details,10 or the community and social effects.11 Dismantling 
the right of workers to meaningful voice, in the workplace and in the boardroom on higher 
level strategic questions, including disinvestment, was arguably more important than closing 
inefficient or ‘uneconomic’ collieries. The analysis of the three phases of the CMGC 
discussions is prefaced by a contextual examination of the changing political economy of 
coal in the decade preceding the strike, starting with the Conservative Party’s ‘Stepping 
Stones’ approach to curtailing union influence, which had a particular saliency in the coal 
industry. There was subsequently tension between the Thatcher government’s enhanced 
prioritization of pit-level and NCB area economic performance, embodied in the 1980 Coal 
Industry Act, and the established moral economy of the coalfields, which the striking miners 
tried unsuccessfully to defend in 1984–5. 
 
                                                             
7 M. Adeney and J. Lloyd, The Miners’ Strike, 1984–5: Loss Without Limit (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1986), pp. 
3–4. 
8 S. Milne, The Enemy Within: the Secret War Against the Miners (Verso: 4th edition, 2014). 
9 F. Beckett and D. Hencke, Marching to the Fault Line. The 1984 Miners’ Strike and the Death of Industrial 
Britain (Constable: 2009); A. McSmith, No Such Thing as Society: a History of the 1980s (Constable: 2010); D. 
Stewart, ‘A Tragic “Fiasco”? The 1984–5 Miners’ Strike in Scotland’, Scottish Labour History 41 (2006), pp. 34–
50. 
10 A. Maxwell, Chicago Tumbles: Cowdenbeath and the Miners’ Strike (Barr Printers, Glenrothes: 1994); J. 
Stead, Never the Same Again. Women and the Miners’ Strike, 1984–5 (Women’s Press: 1987); J. Winterton and 
R. Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict: The 1984–85 Miners’ Strike in Yorkshire (Manchester University Press: 
1989). 
11
 V. Seddon (ed.), The Cutting Edge. Women and the Pit Strike (Lawrence and Wishart: 1986); P. Gibbon and 
D.Steyne, Thurcroft: a Village and the Miners’ Strike: an oral history (Spokesman, Nottingham: 1986); J. Owens 
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The changing political economy of coal, 1974–84 
 
There was a Thatcherite ‘turn’ in Conservative thinking on unions and the economy after the 
defeat of the Heath government in 1974.12 Two initiatives can be emphasized, both 
developed in 1977–8: the Stepping Stones political and communications strategy, and the 
‘Ridley Plan’. Stepping Stones was written by John Hoskyns, policy adviser to Thatcher, and 
Norman Strauss, of Unilever, and included a lengthy annexe, ‘The Union Problem’.13 Unions 
were presented as an oppositional barrier to a Conservative government rather than a 
potential social partner. Their workplace voice and political influence were to be eroded 
indirectly, however, through legislative and political increments, including a concerted 
government communications strategy directly relating an exaggerated view of Britain’s 
alleged economic and industrial problems to union wage demands and opposition to 
productivity improvements.14 The ‘Ridley Plan’ was a four-page appendix to the final report 
of the Conservative Party’s Nationalised Industry Policy Group, leaked to The Economist in 
1978. This argued that Conservative plans for achieving greater ‘efficiency’ in publicly-
owned industries and utilities could be defeated by determined union opposition. In the 
coal industry this would necessitate four counter measures: stockpiling reserves; converting 
power stations to dual coal/oil firing; recruiting non-union road haulage firms to move coal 
and confound sympathetic action by unionized rail workers; and establishing mobile police 
units to outmanoeuvre flying pickets.15 Dorey’s recent analysis of this plan used in its title 
the words of Nigel Lawson, from an interview on the tenth anniversary of the strike: ‘It was 
                                                             
12
 P. Dorey, ‘Conciliation or Confrontation with the Trade Unions? The Conservative Party’s “Authority of 
Government Group”, 1975–1978’, HSIR 27/28 (2009), pp. 135–51; C. Howell, Trade Unions and the State: the 
Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890–2000 (Princeton University Press: 2005), pp. 
131–73; P. Smith and G. Morton, ‘The Conservative Governments’ Reform of Employment Law, 1979–97: 
“Stepping Stones” and the “New Right” Agenda’, HSIR 12 (2001), pp. 131–47. 
13 P. Dorey, ‘The Stepping Stones programme: The Conservative Party’s struggle to develop a Trade Union 
Policy, 1975–79’, HSIR 35 (2014), pp..  
14 J. Tomlinson, ‘Thatcherism, Monetarism and the Politics of Inflation’, in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (eds), 
Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge University Press: 2012), pp. 62–77; J. Hoskyns and N. Strauss, Stepping 
Stones, November 1977, Margaret Thatcher Foundation: 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111771. 
15 J. Saville ‘An Open Conspiracy: Conservative Politics and the Miners’ Strike, 1984–5’, The Socialist Register 22 
(1985–86), pp. 295–329. 
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just like arming to face the threat of Hitler in the late 1930s’.16 This could be seen as a 
composed rationalization of actions after the event, but was consistent with the 
Conservative government’s approach to the coal industry before the strike as well as 
Thatcher’s notorious characterization of the striking miners in July 1984 as ‘the enemy 
within’.17 
Stepping Stones and the Ridley Plan guided the government’s general strategy after 
1979 as well as policy details in the nationalized sectors and industrial relations. The 
budgets of 1979 and 1980 squeezed the money supply and inflation, restrained economic 
activity and widened social inequality, reversing the trend since 1945.18 Ostensibly the 
government’s economic agenda was liberal, ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’, with 
decreased public expenditure and industrial stake to release private enterprise and 
investment and so stimulate economic growth. But the shock therapy of monetarism 
created unexpected economic problems, especially a much greater and more permanent 
loss of industrial employment than had been anticipated, which the government was 
politically obliged to manage, chiefly with increased welfare expenditure, financed by North 
Sea oil revenue. Beatty and Fothergill have shown that the extent of joblessness was hidden 
after 1979-80, with ex-industrial workers incentivized to withdraw from economic activity 
altogether by the structures and mechanisms of the social security system. Those who 
registered as disabled, or ‘permanently sick’, and were therefore nominally unable to work, 
received more attractive benefits than those officially registered as unemployed, these 
being slightly higher in payment and not means-tested. Many recently redundant industrial 
workers in the 1980s had modest occupational pensions which they could access alongside 
sickness benefits, and the earnings of other household members were unaffected. Many 
‘permanently sick’ individuals were neither physically incapable of work, nor seeking to 
evade it, and were unemployed in all but official name. The fundamental problem was the 
disappearance of meaningful economic opportunities. Among all men of working age (16–
64) in Great Britain in 1991 the official measure of unemployment was 10.4% but the ‘real’ 
level was 14.9%. In the coalfields of England, Wales and Scotland unemployment among 
                                                             
16 Dorey, ‘The Ridley Report’, p. 173. 
17 M. Thatcher, Speech to 1922 Committee (‘the enemy within’), 19 July 1984, Margaret Thatcher Foundation: 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105563.  
18 J. Tomlinson, ‘Mrs Thatcher’s Macroeconomic Adventurism, 1979–81, and its Political Consequences’, British 
Politics 2 (2007), pp. 3–19. 
7 
 
 
working age men accelerated after the 1984-5 strike: officially 12.4% in 1991, but ‘really’ 
22.5%.19 
The willingness to fund enhanced benefits for displaced industrial workers was of a 
piece with Stepping Stones, a practical exercise in minimizing opposition to the 
government’s larger strategic objectives. These were less geared to lowering public 
expenditure as an end in itself, and more to constructing a stronger defence of property 
rights and market forces, and widening inequalities in the distribution of economic and 
power resources.20 The right of managers to manage, unbridled by workforce voice and joint 
industrial regulation, was part of this broader strategy, and also pursued in Stepping Stones 
fashion. In this connection Ralph Miliband’s concept of ‘class struggle from above’ is 
apposite. Conservative ministers engaged in highly politicized combat against organized 
labour, to redistribute authority from employees to employers,21 supported by a range of 
social and business elites, including those in the largely anti-trade union print and broadcast 
media.22 Disputes were sequentially triggered by the government with key but isolated 
groups of unionized workers, starting with steel workers in 1980–1, followed by the miners 
in 1984–5, and others in due course, including dock workers. In each instance the dispute 
finished with managerial prerogative significantly enhanced.23 
The government’s strategy transgressed the moral economy of the coalfields. This 
had two main elements: substantial changes to the organization of work, including closures, 
redundancies and redeployment of labour, should be effected with the agreement of union 
representatives; and such changes could only be acceptable to workers where the economic 
security of their communities was guaranteed.24 E. P. Thompson’s moral economy related to 
popular customs and expectations developed over a long time frame, from the sixteenth to 
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 C. Beatty and S. Fothergill, ‘Labour Market Adjustment in Areas of Chronic Industrial Decline: The Case of the 
UK Coalfields’, Regional Studies 30.7 (1996), pp. 627–40. 
20 A. Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: the Politics of Thatcherism (Macmillan, Basingstoke: 
1994). 
21 R. Miliband, Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1989), 
pp. 115–66. 
22 G. Williams (ed.), Settling Scores: The Media, the Police and the Miners’ Strike (Campaign for Press and 
Broadcasting Freedom: 2014); Milne, Enemy Within, pp. 364–7; G. Philo, ‘News Content and Audience Belief: a 
case study of the 1984–5 Miners’ Strike’ (Phd, University of Glasgow: 1989). 
23 A. Taylor, ‘The “Stepping Stones” Programme: Conservative Party Thinking on Trade Unions, 1975–9’, HSIR 
11 (2001), pp. 109–25. 
24 J. Phillips, ‘The Moral Economy and Deindustrialization in the Scottish Coalfields, 1947–1991, International 
Labor and Working Class History 84 (2013), pp. 99–115. 
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the eighteenth centuries, involving collective action in its defence against profit-seeking 
employers and traders.25 The coalfield moral economy rested on a shorter evolution, with 
inter-war roots, and encouraged by the redistribution of wealth and esteem from middle to 
working class that applied generally in post-1945 Britain,26 along with the material fact of 
coal industry nationalization in 1947. NCB publicity materials, including nationally-
distributed films, emphasized the value of workforce consultation and social justice when 
arriving at decisions about investment and closures,27 and there was substance to these 
claims. The radical contraction of the 1960s, where the labour force was more than halved, 
was consistent with the moral economy, buttressed by the joint industrial structures 
established under nationalization: NCB officials negotiated the closures with union 
representatives.28 The management of structural adjustment included, moreover, significant 
employment stimulation in the coalfields, engineered by enhanced UK government regional 
policy incentives from 1962 to 1970.29 The 1964–70 Labour governments were especially 
keen movers of capital and labour from coal and other ‘heavy’ industries to higher value-
added consumer goods production, which would contribute to faster rates of macro-
economic growth.30 The case of Fife, the largest coalfield territory in Scotland after 
nationalization, illustrates the inter-connected processes of collective bargaining, mine 
closures and regional planning. From 1951 to 1971 the number of men employed in coal in 
Fife fell from 24,111 to 8,040, but this was accepted by union negotiators because there was 
no overall reduction in the overall number of economically active persons (just over 130,000 
in each year). There was a particular increase in the female share of industrial employment, 
chiefly in electrical engineering, as US firms were established – via UK regional policy 
incentives – in the New Town of Glenrothes.31 
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 E. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past and Present 50 
(1971), pp. 76–136. 
26 R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England, 1918–1951 (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 161. 
27 Data Film Productions, Replanning a Coalfield (NCB Mining Review: 1949), directed by Peter Pickering with 
commentary by John Slater. This film is preserved by the BFI National Archive, and features on the DVD two 
disc-set, National Coal Board Collection, Volume One, Portrait of a Miner (BFI: 2009). 
28 W. Ashworth, The History of the British Coal Industry, Vol. 5, 1946–1982: the nationalised industry (Oxford 
University Press: 1986), pp. 256–63. 
29 P. Scott, ‘Regional development and policy’, in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds), The Cambridge Economic 
History of Modern Britain. Vol. 3, Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000 (Cambridge University Press: 
2004), pp. 332–67. 
30 Department of Economic Affairs, The National Plan (London, 1965), Cmnd. 2764, pp. 84–100, 120–22. 
31 Phillips, ‘Moral Economy’, pp. 104–5. 
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The rate of colliery closures and associated job losses decelerated in the 1970s. 
There were two explanations for this. Scale economies in new or surviving pits enhanced the 
possibilities of mechanization; and the radical upward movement of oil prices from 1973 
improved coal’s market position. The Labour government elected in 1974 introduced the 
Plan For Coal, negotiated with the NCB and unions, envisaging a stable and long-term future 
for the industry.32 The position was reversed after 1979, when Thatcher’s Conservative 
government introduced the 1980 Coal Industry Act, a near-direct consequence of the work 
undertaken by Ridley’s Nationalised Industries Group. This projected an end to state subsidy 
by 1983–4, a highly ambitious aim, according to the industry’s official historian in the 
context of recession and deindustrialization.33 Further pressure was being exerted on the 
NCB to control its prices by the Central Electricity Generating Board, which was state-
controlled and responding to changing government priorities.34 The government sought 
further cost reduction by directing the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) to 
examine the NCB. The MMC, reporting in 1983, found that annual savings of £300 million 
could be achieved if production was reduced by 10% by closing the least ‘economic’ pits.35 
The MMC findings were based, however, on highly problematic NCB production costs, 
including expenditure arising from past activities, such as compensation for subsidence, 
pensions to retired employees and payments to redundant miners. Critics of the report also 
observed that performance itself was highly subjective, and varied according to investment, 
with a strong correlation between the ‘best’ producing pits and those with the highest rates 
of capital support.36 
The new political economy was consolidated in 1983 when the government 
appointed Ian MacGregor as NCB Chairman. MacGregor was a Scots-American businessman 
who characterized the MMC report on coal as his ‘bible’,37 and had recently served as 
Chairman of the BSC, where costs and union influence had been radically reduced through 
plant closures and the reduction of employment from roughly 166,000 in 1980 to just 
                                                             
32 A. Taylor, The NUM and British Politics. Vol. 2: 1969–1995 (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2005), pp. 113–7. 
33 Ashworth, British Coal Industry, pp. 414–15. 
34 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss Without Limit, pp. 15–20. 
35 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, National Coal Board, Cmnd. 8920 (HMSO: 1983), Vol. 1, pp. 363–6, 
and Vol. 2, Appendices 3.3 and 3.5(a). 
36 A. Glyn, ‘The Economic Case Against Pit Closures’, and T. Cutler, C. Haslam, J. Williams and K. Williams, ‘The 
Aberystwyth Report on Coal’, in D. Cooper and T. Hopper (eds), Debating Coal Closures: economic calculation 
in the coal dispute, 1984–5 (Cambridge University Press: 1988), pp. 57–94 and 161–94. 
37 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss Without Limit, pp. 23, 27. 
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71,000 in 1983.38 Literature on the 1984 strike often situates its origins in MacGregor’s 
arrival at the NCB,39 but his anti-union methods, especially unilateral colliery closures and 
pit-level abandonment of joint industrial procedures, were already being pioneered by 
Albert Wheeler, Scottish NCB Area Director from 1980. So much was this the case that after 
a string of pit-level strikes and lock-outs in the course of 1983, roughly 50% of Scotland’s 
miners were already in dispute with local management when the national strike began in 
March 1984.40 
 
 
The Strike and its Phases 
 
The strike developed out of this changing political economy. The NUM’s attempt to secure a 
complete stoppage in defence of pits threatened in this new environment continues to 
divide opinion. There was no national ballot of members. Instead the federal structure of 
the union was deployed so that its discrete constituents, such as the NUM Scottish Area, 
could utilize area procedures to declare area strikes. Areas on strike then ‘encouraged’ 
other areas to join, in the first instance through picketing pits where miners continued 
working. The rationale for this approach was fairly clear. Miners in dispute with local 
management because their pit was threatened would not have been persuaded to return to 
work if the outcome of a national ballot had been against strike action. It was unjust, argued 
Peter Heathfield, NUM general secretary, for one man, in effect, to vote another man out of 
a job.41 The absence of a national ballot was nevertheless highly problematic, contributing 
to internal union divisions that the government and its supporters exploited. These divisions 
pre-existed the strike. relates the distinct history and politics of the Nottinghamshire miners 
to their conduct in 1984–5, with the majority working throughout and resisting the call for 
                                                             
38 M. W. Kirby, ‘MacGregor, Sir Ian Kinloch (1912–1998)’, in H. Matthew and B. Harrison (eds), Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press: 2004), pp. 433–5. 
39 Beckett and Hencke, Marching to the Fault Line, pp. 36–7. 
40 J. Phillips, Collieries, Communities and the Miners’ Strike in Scotland, 1984–85 (Manchester University Press: 
2012), pp. 53–80. 
41 H. Beynon, ‘Introduction’, in H. Beynon (ed.), Digging Deeper. Issues in the Miners’ Strike (Verso: 1985), pp. 
12–13. 
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solidarity with workers in other coalfield areas: they had supported the action in defence of 
wages in the great lock-out of 1926 but returned to work before the dispute ended in most 
other areas.42 Nottinghamshire miners had also been instrumental in establishing the NCB’s 
programme of area-based pay incentives in 1977–8, against union opposition in Kent, South 
Wales, Yorkshire and Scotland. After the apparent solidarity of the NUM’s victories in 
national pay strikes in 1972 and 1974 this highlighted the limits of cross-coalfield unity, as 
the NCB had hoped and union critics of area pay incentives had feared.43 In 1984 the 
Nottingham working miners, distancing themselves further politically from other areas, 
viewed the absence of a national ballot as a breach of union rules. Howell shows that they 
were further offended by the presence at their pits of invaders from Yorkshire and other 
areas seeking to enforce the strike through picketing.44 
The picketing in Nottinghamshire and rejection of a national ballot were part of the 
NUM’s ‘orthodox Marxist industrial relations strategy’, the phrase used by Ackers in his 
study of debates in 1984-5 among ‘Eurocommunists’ within the Communist Party of Great 
Britain, including Michael McGahey, NUM vice-president and Scottish Area president. 
Eurocommunists were troubled by the strategy, especially on the ballot, but also by mass 
picketing of working mines, power stations and steel works, accompanied as this was by 
instances of disorder and violence, triggering legal action against the NUM and its members, 
with arrests, convictions, bindings over, and summary sackings. Such contention constrained 
the strikers’ capacity to build an alliance of anti-government political and social forces. The 
NUM’s strategy isolated the strikers, in other words, with a disastrous long-term legacy of 
coalfield deindustrialization, unemployment, and deprivation.45 This is a serious argument, 
although it should be added that McGahey, while a guardian at least within Scotland of 
cross-party political alliances, was also a forceful advocate of proceeding without a national 
ballot.46 Details from the Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal demonstrate, moreover, that 
the NUM’s isolation and defeat were deliberately constructed and secured by the 
                                                             
42 C. Griffin, ‘“Notts. have some very peculiar history”: Understanding the Reaction of the Nottinghamshire 
Miners to the 1984–85 Strike’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 19 (2005), pp. 63–99. 
43 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, pp. 15–17. 
44 D. Howell, ‘Defiant Dominoes: Working Miners and the 1984–5 Strike’, in Jackson and Saunders, Making 
Thatcher’s Britain, pp. 148–64. 
45 P. Ackers, ‘Gramsci at the Miners’ Strike: Remembering the 1984–1985 Eurocommunist Alternative 
Industrial Relations Strategy’, Labor History, online, first published 11 March 2014. 
46 J. McIlroy, and A. Campbell, ‘McGahey, Michael (Mick) (1925–1999)’, in K. Gildart and D. Howell (eds), 
Dictionary of Labour Biography. Vol. 13 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke: 2010), pp. 242–51. 
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government, illustrating vividly Miliband’s ‘class struggle from above’.47 Other groups of 
workers were kept out of the strike, inhibiting the mobilization of broader anti-government 
forces.48 Outwith the labour movement there was limited support for the strike from Church 
leaders, but otherwise the NUM was able to establish meaningful alliances only with groups 
that were already marginalized and excoriated by the government and its political and 
media supporters, notably the Greenham women campaigning against nuclear weapons, 
and gay and lesbian activists.49  
 
Containing the Striking Miners, March to May 1984 
The key elements of government policy in the containment phase are evident from the 
initial three meetings of the CMGC. The priority was preventing the strike from spreading 
beyond the areas where miners stopped working in the week beginning 12 March: Scotland, 
Northumberland, Durham, Yorkshire, South Wales, and Kent. A low-key approach, with 
minimal public statement, would maximize the number of miners working elsewhere, and 
the strategic importance of Nottinghamshire was recognized. With the situation delicate 
ministers awaited the outcome of area ballots, held on 16 March in Nottinghamshire and 
the Midlands,50 and then ensured that those voting to work could do so, with full additional 
costs of policing to be met from the Exchequer.51 The efforts of local NUM officials to 
enforce the strike were resisted by the vast majority of Nottinghamshire’s 34,000 miners, 
first in an individual ballot, and then in an area council meeting.52 With this highly 
productive sector in operation Walker reported early in May that coal stocks would last 
comfortably into 1985.53 
 Central to the low-key approach was government non-intervention, with ministers 
publicly insisting that the dispute was between the NUM and the NCB. This was tenuous, 
given state ownership of the industry and the NCB’s obligation to operate within the 
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financial and policy framework established by the government, and the CMGC minutes 
clearly demonstrate that non-intervention was a fiction. With miners in Nottinghamshire, 
the Midlands and parts elsewhere voting to continue working, NCB officials were 
contemplating legal action against the NUM in the final week of March to restrain the 
movement and activities of pickets outside working collieries. Sometimes numbering 
hundreds, these strikers were contravening the provisions of the 1980 and 1982 
Employment Acts which placed restrictions on secondary picketing.54 A number of 
commentators wondered during and immediately after the strike why this legislation was 
not used against NUM pickets, and explained this in terms of the government’s desire to 
avoid political controversy. Using anti-union Tory laws, as some people characterized them, 
to prosecute miners acting in defence of their jobs and communities might have 
strengthened broader labour movement support for the strike.55 The minutes of the CMGC 
confirm that this suspicion was correct, with ministers agreeing to discourage the NCB from 
taking action in the courts against the NUM picketing. With all pits in Nottingham still 
working, Walker reported on 19 March that MacGregor had come to see the ‘tactical 
advantage’ of adjourning the NCB’s proposed action against the NUM in the High Court.56 
An alternative legal strategy against the strike was subsequently developed, but this 
did not involve the 1980 or 1982 legislation, and the government was only tangentially 
involved. A key figure appears to have been David Hart, businessman, Conservative activist 
and occasional adviser to Thatcher and MacGregor during the strike.57 The anti-strike legal 
manoeuvre was complex. It seems that Hector Laing, chairman of United Biscuits, 
Conservative supporter and personal friend of the Prime Minister, wrote to leaders of one 
hundred or so large private sector firms, requesting financial support for working miners.58 
These donations may have totalled about £500,000, roughly £1.4 million in 2014 values. 
Hart, it can be surmised, channelled this money to working miners, who sued the NUM over 
the legal applicability of a 1981 vote in Yorkshire for industrial action in defence of pits. This 
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vote had supported the NUM’s claim that the strike in Yorkshire was official, which was in 
turn central to the demand for a national strike, on an area by area basis, at the union’s 
special delegate conference on 19 April.59 The High Court in London ruled against the NUM 
in September, to the effect that the 1981 vote was too remote in time to apply in 1984, and 
restrained the union from characterizing the strike as official.60 NUM leaders felt obliged to 
defy the ruling, leading in October to the sequestration of union assets in England and 
Wales, although not in Scotland, where the separate legal jurisdiction found the strike to be 
lawful.61 The CMGC files do not show that the government was directing this legal strategy, 
but there were oblique references in its July meetings to the need to mobilize sympathetic 
business leaders against the strikes of both miners and dock workers.62 Thatcher’s papers, it 
should be added, include letters from Hart indicating that she was kept closely informed 
about the progress of the anti-strike litigation, which plainly exacerbated the political 
marginalization of the NUM,63 and formed the basis for the establishment among working 
miners of the rival Union of Democratic Mineworkers.64 
 The government’s interventionist role is demonstrated in another episode from the 
first phase of the strike. Conscious that the stoppage was having minimal immediate impact 
on electricity supply, the NUM sought leverage through controlling movements of coal to 
BSC works. In Scotland the key target was Ravenscraig in Motherwell. NUM Scottish Area 
officials negotiated a ‘Triple Alliance’ agreement with rail and steel workers’ union officials 
for the transport of coal by train to Ravenscraig from the BSC terminal at Hunterston on the 
Clyde coast, sufficient only to maintain the furnaces. This agreement lasted for much of 
April but local and national BSC managers pressed for increased supply to maintain 
production.65 On 30 April Tebbit advised the CMGC that Ravenscraig’s shortage of coal was 
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the only major industrial difficulty across the UK arising from the strike.66 With the NUM 
nationally calling for a cessation of all rail movement of coal, BSC management at 
Ravenscraig broke the ‘Triple Alliance’ embargo with a major road haulage effort from 2 
May. The NUM Scottish Area responded with major pickets at Hunterston and Ravenscraig, 
a combined force of around 3,000 miners on 7 May. The Scottish Office believed that these 
pickets could succeed in halting the coal deliveries, in which case production would cease 
within three days. At this point there was a crucial intervention. Scottish Office materials 
read by this author under a Freedom of Information request in 2007 indicated that this 
came from Bob Haslam, BSC chairman, who asked Department of Energy Officials on 8 May 
whether police officers in Scotland had considered acting to prevent pickets from gathering 
at Hunterston and Ravenscraig.67 This request was passed to the Scottish Office and, it could 
be inferred, to Strathclyde Police, officers of which force on 10 May halted 290 miners from 
West Fife, Clackmannan and Stirlingshire on the A80 at Stepps, many miles from 
Ravenscraig and Hunterston. Dozens of miners were arrested and held for several hours at 
different police stations in Glasgow. The CMGC minutes indicate that this decisive 
intervention was in fact from the Prime Minister rather than the BSC chairman. In discussing 
the crisis at Ravenscraig on 8 May Ministers asked why Scottish chief constables had not 
shared the readiness of their English equivalents to stop pickets building up at key pinch 
points. Thatcher directed the Secretary of State for Scotland to explore this specific question 
with Scottish chief constables, using public order legislation ‘to prevent pickets going to the 
scene of possible disturbances’.68 The effect was immediate, the Scottish police acting 
against striking miners on the open roads of Lanarkshire in the same way that English police 
were halting the entry of striking miners to Nottinghamshire and other working areas, 
including Derbyshire.69 The pressure on Ravenscraig was released, and the government 
survived the first major industrial crisis of the strike. 
 
Isolating the Striking Miners, May to October 1984 
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On 14 May Thatcher spoke in the CMGC explicitly about ostracizing the striking miners. It 
was vital, she said, to ‘maintain as far as possible the isolation of the miners from the 
effective support of the rest of the union movement’. This comment was triggered by a 
discussion about pay negotiations at British Railways, settled as a consequence of 
government pressure at the end of May. But the importance of distancing the miners from 
other unionized workers had already been evident in the strike, chiefly in relation to 
developments within BSC. Thatcher had noted in April that union members in sectors where 
production and jobs were jeopardized by disrupted coal supply could be mobilized in the 
anti-strike effort, and commended the extent to which ‘the steel unions had given a lead’ 
already.70 This was a telling comment. The government and its allies, including BSC 
management, clearly preyed on the anxieties of steel workers, amplified as these were by 
the radical restructuring of their industry in 1980–1. This explains the duplicitous behaviour 
of Iron and Steel Trades Confederation stewards at Ravenscraig, including Tommy Brennan, 
their convenor, who routinely fed intelligence about union strategy and tactics – gleaned 
from ‘Triple Alliance’ talks with miners and railwaymen in Edinburgh – to local managers, 
who passed this to the Scottish Office and Strathclyde Police.71 For this Brennan and the 
other stewards were thinly rewarded. The Conservative government blocked pre- and post-
privatization BSC plans to end production at Ravenscraig in 1987–88. But the company 
chose not to reinvest in the plant, and it closed in 1992.72 
The government’s ambition to isolate the striking miners is further illustrated by its 
handling of the NUM’s attempted blockade of the BSC coke depot at Orgreave in South 
Yorkshire, the scene of intensive picketing and policing on a number of occasions in this 
second phase of the strike, peaking on 18 June. There is no direct evidence in the CMCG 
minutes that the government was controlling policing at the depot, which continues to be 
controversial in the 2010s, with strong indications that senior officers organized the 
fabrication of evidence against pickets,73 but ministers adopted a highly selective reading of 
events there. Walker reported the fact of ‘serious violence’ at Orgreave, but offered no 
explanation for this disorder other than ‘the presence of Mr Scargill’. Thatcher emphasized 
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her intention that it be made publicly clear this ‘violent picketing’ would not prevent the 
movement of materials to BSC works,74 and she succeeded in drawing a number of the 
government’s political opponents into criticizing the NUM, including David Steel, leader of 
the Liberal Party.75 Ministerial pronouncements on Orgreave and other high-profile 
instances of disorder wilfully ignored or distorted the motives and actions of the strikers, 
but nevertheless contributed to the wider dissemination – through a pliant and partisan 
media – of the government’s anti-union agenda and strike strategy. Further political capital 
certainly accrued to the government, consolidating the containment and isolation of the 
striking miners.76 
 More troubling for the government, at least for a week or so in July, was the position 
in the ports. This briefly offered the prospect of the broader labour movement action that 
ministers were determined to avoid, and was only resolved after Ridley’s dissembling 
statement in the House of Commons to the effect that there were no plans to abolish the 
National Dock Labour Scheme. The national dock strike began on 10 July after BSC 
employees handled materials in the Humber port of Immingham. Under Dock Labour 
Scheme regulations this work was properly the province of registered dock workers, who 
were Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) members. The TGWU and many of its 
dock members had been worried about threats to the Scheme since the 1960s, when the 
containerization revolution had transformed the labour process and stimulated the growth 
of operations in non-Scheme ports.77 
Tebbit warned the CMGC on 11 July about the damaging effects of the dock strike, 
with potential problems for steel and ‘early prospect of more serious difficulty for industry 
generally’ arising from the interruption of imports and exports. Thatcher intervened, stating 
that government had to show resolve over the next forty-eight hours, to energize public 
opinion, particularly among workers in industries affected by strike. It was vital, she said, to 
show that the ‘pretext’ for the dock workers’ action was false: they enjoyed ‘extraordinary 
privileges’ in job security and pay, given that 4,000 of their 13,000 in number were allegedly 
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surplus to ‘the genuine requirements of their industry’. At this point, however, Stepping 
Stones counsel prevailed against a direct attack, the government evading action against the 
dockers as well as the miners. Amid the twin crises of damaging dock strike and the 
continuing coal dispute the time was ‘not opportune’ to abolish the Scheme. The Prime 
Minister returned to this theme several days later. While the jobs of workers across export- 
and import-dependent industries were jeopardized, the government would keep Britain 
working, if necessary by using army personnel. Possibly alluding to the parallel legal strategy 
developing against the striking miners, Thatcher added that large employers and the 
Confederation of British Industry should be mobilized to share the work of publicizing the 
economic damage caused by trade union members. But it was still essential for the 
government to emphasize that there were ‘no plans to abolish or change the National Dock 
Labour Scheme’.78 Ridley duly informed the House of Commons that there would be no 
repeat of BSC’s incursion on dock workers’ practices of the type that had triggered the 
strike, and – more or less using Thatcher’s very words – that the government had ‘no plans 
to change or abolish the Dock Labour Scheme’.79 After talks at the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS), focusing on the use of non-registered labour in Scheme ports, 
the dock workers ended their stoppage on 23 July,80 concluding perhaps the greatest 
economic and political crisis encountered by the government during the miners’ strike, and 
rendering superfluous the plans to declare a State of Emergency and deploy troops in the 
movement of cargoes. A shorter strike followed in the ports in September, again arising 
from the unloading of coal by BSC employees, although this time in Hunterston, but was 
more patchily supported than the July stoppage. Many of the dock workers involved in this 
second strike were deeply ambivalent about returning to work, convinced that behind 
Ridley’s public words the government was privately committed to abolishing the Scheme.81 
The CMGC minutes demonstrate that this was indeed the position, and, in classic Stepping 
Stones fashion, having isolated and defeated the striking miners, the government abolished 
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the Scheme in 1989, effectively ending joint regulation and employment stability in the 
ports.82 
 The government also pursued the isolation of the striking miners by micro-managing 
the ‘peace’ talks between the NCB and NUM, which commenced in June, and proceeded 
with several interruptions across the summer and into the autumn. The NUM leadership 
was criticized by the NCB and the government, and also by other union and Labour Party 
representatives, for adopting an inflexible approach to these negotiations by insisting that 
no pits be closed unless it could be proven that reserves were exhausted. In recent 
literature the alleged rigidities of the union’s approach to negotiations have also been 
strongly emphasized. Ackers suggests that the NUM should have engaged more effectively 
with the NCB case for closures, using community-sustainability arguments to pursue a 
compromise settlement and avoid the ‘heroic defeat’ that hastened coalfield 
deindustrialization.83 This theme has been explored elsewhere in the literature, sometimes 
in terms of the counter-factual: had negotiations been led by McGahey, depicted as more 
pragmatic, astute, and imaginative than Scargill, then a settlement preserving the majority 
of pits and jobs would have been achieved.84 In an important memoir, Ned Smith, NCB 
industrial relations director, presented an alternative counter-factual, arguing that as 
president McGahey would have avoided the strike altogether. But Smith also showed that 
once the strike was underway a settlement was blocked by the intransigence of MacGregor 
and, he suspected, the government – rather than the inflexibility of the NUM. When the 
talks commenced in June, Smith believed that MacGregor, operating under government 
instruction, was already opposed to an agreement on pit closures. Before the penultimate 
talks in September, Smith overheard MacGregor tell a telephone caller that there would be 
no settlement. McGahey was likewise convinced that MacGregor was instructed by the 
government throughout these talks.85 
                                                             
82 Department of Employment, Employment in the Ports: the Dock Labour Scheme, Cm. 664 (HMSO, 1989); P. 
Turnbull, C. Woolfson and J. Kelly, Dock Strike. Conflict and Restructuring in Britain’s Ports (Avebury, Aldershot: 
1992). 
83 Ackers, ‘Gramsci at the Miners’ Strike’, pp. 16–17. 
84 Beckett and Hencke, Marching to the Fault Line, pp. 103–46, 179–200. 
85
 N. Smith, The 1984 Miners’ Strike. The Actual Account (Whitstable: 1997), pp. 127–8; NUMSA Strike 
Committee minutes, 15 October 1984, National Union of Mineworkers Scottish Area, Box 13, National Mining 
Museum Scotland, Newtongrange (hereafter NMMS). 
20 
 
 
 The CMGC minutes confirm that Smith and McGahey were correct in their 
suspicions. Thatcher told the group on 30 May that the NCB’s ‘negotiating brief’ would have 
to be ‘clearly delineated’, meaning that an agreement must only be secured where the NUM 
accepted that pits would be closed on economic grounds, and that the NCB would have the 
ultimate authority to effect closures where such grounds existed. Before talks in July she 
argued that ‘it was important that the terms [of any resolution] should be seen to permit 
the closures sought by the NCB before the strike’.86 Negotiations in September were 
complicated for the government by the intervention of Stan Orme, Shadow Energy 
Secretary, who proposed that unresolved closures be referred to a panel of two mining 
engineers and a lawyer.87 Thatcher evidently discussed this with David Hart, who handed 
her a terse formula for a settlement that would entrench the NCB’s prerogative powers to 
close mines against workforce opposition: 
 
It is agreed that pits may be closed on grounds other than exhaustion or safety. 
Included in this category and deemed to be exhausted are pits where a report of 
examination by the respective NCB and NUM engineers does not provide the NCB 
with a basis for continued operations which constitute a responsible use of human or 
financial resources [emphasis added].88 
 
In the CMGC that followed Thatcher duly stipulated that the ‘most important requirement 
would be an agreement that would not in any way fetter the NCB in arranging the closure, 
as and when necessary, of uneconomic pits’. Walker agreed, describing Orme’s panel as 
‘totally unacceptable’ because it would deprive the NCB of managerial responsibility for 
deciding the future of particular pits.89 
Thatcher and Walker were articulating the core importance of managerial 
prerogative in coal production. This amounted to a direct attack on the industry’s joint 
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regulatory framework, and the moral economy assumptions that had shaped coalfield 
development, including the carefully-managed process of contraction since the 1950s. It is 
hard to see how an agreement providing the NCB with unilateral powers to determine 
future closures could have been acceptable to the striking miners, and McGahey understood 
this. The July talks, for example, foundered on the NCB’s insistence on the word 
‘beneficially’: pits would close when their reserves could no longer be ‘beneficially 
developed’. McGahey told the NUM Scottish Area executive that ‘beneficially’ had an 
‘economic connotation’, and ‘if a colliery was not beneficial in terms of profits, it was not 
economically viable’, so the NCB would close it. The NUM could not accept this, he argued, 
‘rejecting any concept of uneconomic closures, this being the basic, fundamental and 
central question of the whole dispute’.90 Fittingly, given the government’s close control of 
NCB strategy, Walker had informed the CMGC at 6 p.m. on 18 July that these negotiations 
were about to collapse,91 before they had done so, several hours later that evening.92 The 
government was clearly using the succession of failed negotiations, which its insistence on 
ending the joint regulation of pit closures had effectively guaranteed, to isolate the striking 
miners further. The CMGC habitually discussed in advance of talks taking place how their 
collapse would be communicated to the media. A representative example comes from 4 
July, the day before NUM-NCB meetings in London. Assuming the talks would fail to reach 
agreement, Thatcher said a major effort would be undertaken to ‘blame’ Scargill and ‘his 
intransigence’.93 This anticipated more or less exactly the thrust of the government and NCB 
response when these talks foundered, two weeks later.94 
The isolation of the NUM was consolidated by the government’s handling of the final 
significant crisis of the strike, the threat of industrial action by NACODS members in 
October, also in opposition to colliery closures. These employees were responsible for the 
safety of underground operations. Had they gone on strike, then production would have 
ceased altogether, bringing Nottinghamshire and other working areas into the strike, and 
halting the NCB’s ‘return to work’ in Scotland, Northumberland, Durham, Yorkshire, and 
South Wales. Ministers worried about the impact of this on energy endurance: substantial 
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reserves existed but would quickly run down, necessitating additional imports and greater 
oil burn. Thatcher instructed CMGC members not to take action or make public statements 
that would prejudice the outcome of NACODS-NCB dialogue about procedures for managing 
closures. At the same time Walker worked to ensure that any changes to these procedures 
would not compromise the NCB’s capacity to reach binding decisions on closures without 
third-party involvement.95 Talks at ACAS duly produced a new procedure that satisfied the 
NACODS leadership but on fine reading – and in subsequent practice – cemented the 
sovereignty of the NCB on closures, and the further erosion of joint regulation in the 
industry.96 
 
Defeating the Striking Miners, October 1984 onwards 
The NACODS settlement was decisive in terms of the outcome of the strike. It is significant 
that the CMGC reduced its weekly load thereafter from two meetings to one. Its main 
business was documenting and encouraging the NCB’s ‘return to work’ effort, which had 
commenced in June, but only gathered real momentum after October. The government was 
now more or less explicitly discouraging further negotiations between the NCB and the 
NUM lest these motivate strikers to persist in the belief that an agreement might be 
reached. Subsequent approaches to the government from the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress and the Trades Union Congress, both in December, seeking dialogue as a step 
towards negotiating an honourable settlement, were handled with discretion. Ministers 
deferred further meaningful negotiations without showing that the government was 
blocking a settlement, with the aim of increasing the pressure on strikers to return to 
work.97 Smith lamented in his memoir that the government and MacGregor from the 
summer of 1984 onwards were committed to ‘the grinding defeat’ of ‘our employees’ and 
‘the dreadful bitterness which that entailed’. The possibility of peace was distanced, Smith 
argued, in two particular ways: the organized resumption of work by the NCB from 
September, co-ordinated with armoured buses and reinforced policing; and the 
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government’s ‘verbal violence’, with Thatcher’s ‘enemy within’ speech accompanied by 
Lawson’s highly illuminating claim that the economic and financial costs of the strike were a 
‘worthwhile investment’.98 Estimated at £6 billion, or £14 billion at 2014 prices, in lost 
production and tax revenues, charges for replacement coal stocks and additional oil burn, 
reduced economic activity, and the huge policing charges,99 these costs massively exceeded 
the NCB’s pre-strike projected losses for 1984–5 of £100 million.100 This juxtaposition of the 
industry’s relatively modest financial losses with the massive economic costs of defeating 
the miners reinforces the impression that the government’s over-riding strategic priority, in 
the strike and across the 1980s generally, was dismantling joint industrial regulation rather 
than optimizing economic performance. 
 The government’s goal of complete and unconditional victory can be read in the 
CMGC minutes, with Walker’s weekly reports diligently documenting the smallest signs that 
the strike was weakening, even – or perhaps especially – in coalfield areas that in truth the 
government and NCB regarded as marginal to the industry’s future. In Scotland miners first 
returned to work at Bilston Glen in Midlothian in June, but in numbers – thirty initially – that 
were barely sufficient to produce coal. Walker still regarded this development as key to the 
growth of ‘the momentum of the return to work’.101 The limited resumption in the summer 
more generally across the areas on strike was therefore frustrating for the government. In 
July Thatcher told the CMGC that the NCB should accelerate the end of the strike through 
‘persuasion’ and ‘concrete’ initiatives, including ‘secure transport into pits’.102 Reinforcing 
the fiction of government non-intervention, these methods were subsequently adopted by 
the NCB.103 
The organized back-to-work campaign had three chief side effects, all desirable from 
the government’s perspective. First, bitterness was exacerbated in the coalfields, between 
strikers and working miners, and between the NUM and the NCB, extending divisions that 
endured long after the strike, and further diminishing the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement. Second, there was an escalation in strike-related disorder. This was another 
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area where government micro-management can be read in the CMGC minutes, as ministers 
discussed the need to remove delays in legal proceedings against pickets, especially those 
engaged in more serious alleged offences.104 Strike officials and activists in Scotland were 
convinced that the courts were directed to inflict unusually harsh penalties on miners. The 
CMGC minutes do not bear this out explicitly, but Scottish Office ministers certainly pressed 
the Procurators Fiscal to accelerate cases against miners as a means of disciplining and 
discouraging the generality of strikers. Victimization was accordingly proportionately higher 
in Scotland than elsewhere: 206 Scottish miners, 1.5% of the strikers, were sacked, 
compared with about 800 or 0.6% of the strikers in England and Wales.105 Third, the NUM, 
provoked by the NCB’s action, withdrew safety cover from the pits, which it had been 
providing in the normal way so that production could resume once the strike was over. This 
led to the premature loss of several collieries to flooding. One of these was in Scotland, 
where the Area director, Albert Wheeler, responded to the NUM boycott by withdrawing 
managerial safety cover, with the consequence that Polkemmet in West Lothian – the usual 
source of coal for Ravenscraig – was disastrously flooded on 28 August 1984. Milne argues 
that security service officers were covertly involved in this operation, guiding the strike-
breaking that provoked the NUM withdrawal of safety cover and then Wheeler’s crucial 
counter-measure.106 Coal was never produced again at Polkemment, which closed in 
1986.107 The CMGC discussion of Polkemmet, led by Giles Shaw, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State at the Department of Energy, deputizing for Walker, focused on the 
NUM’s withdrawal of safety cover, and made no reference to Wheeler’s arguably decisive 
contribution. Thatcher saw the incident as an additional means of isolating the NUM 
leadership, which was to be blamed entirely for the loss of the pit and its employment.108 
 The return to work in the striking areas gathered some pace in late autumn. On 13 
November, Walker reported that 45 pits – all in the areas working since March – were 
producing normally; twelve more were turning coal, 48 others had miners present, and 69 
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were on strike.109 The special NCB incentive of Christmas bonuses to all who returned by 19 
November then altered the position slightly,110 so that only 24 pits were fully out on 26 
November, although two-thirds of NUM members remained on strike. Walker spoke about a 
particular acceleration of the return to work in the north-east of England and Scotland,111 
but in the latter case this was confined largely to Bilston Glen and the two Ayrshire pits, 
Killoch and Barony. Among the 10,000-plus miners elsewhere in Scotland just 185 were 
working on 5 November, according to possibly inflated NCB data, and of this cohort more 
than two-thirds were still on strike four months later, on 5 March 1985.112 The 
government’s target generally across the coalfields was 50% of miners in the pits, akin, 
Walker argued, ‘to a vote in the national ballot in favour of returning to work’, but this was 
not yet achieved by 18 December, when the CMGC met for the final time in 1984 
. Whitelaw, chairing the meeting in Thatcher’s absence, nevertheless congratulated Walker 
for his recent efforts, including the careful handling with Tom King of a meeting with the 
TUC on 14 December,113 which deferred the prospect of any resumption of NCB-NUM 
negotiations until at least the New Year.114 These talks took place eventually in London on 
21 January 1985, with Smith and Heathfield as the main negotiators. Smith felt they were 
constructive but when Heathfield left at 3 p.m. to consult with NUM colleagues he saw an 
Evening Standard headline declaring that they had failed. This, Smith learned, was the 
combined work of the Prime Minister’s office and senior staff at the NCB, with David Hart 
involved. The government was continuing in 1985 as it had throughout 1984, obstructing 
dialogue in order to inflict complete defeat upon the NUM and the striking miners.115 The 
strike eventually ended without an agreement. Most miners returned to work on Tuesday 5 
March, but initial picketing by Kent and Scots miners, to demand reinstatement of their 
sacked colleagues, meant there was not an effectively full return until Monday 11 March, 
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eight days after an NUM delegate conference in London voted very narrowly for this 
outcome.116 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The CMGC minutes from March to December 1984 show that the Conservative government 
adopted a highly strategic approach to the miners’ strike, with clearly defined and 
remorselessly pursued goals. The spread of the strike and its economic effects were 
contained; the striking miners were socially and politically isolated; and then defeated. In 
this broad sense the minutes offer no direct challenge to the predominant existing 
interpretation of the strike as a fundamental political and ideological conflict between the 
government and the NUM. The minutes confirm how important the outcome of the strike 
was to the government and its broader political strategy, redistributing wealth from lower-
income to higher-income groups, and moving authority within workplaces from employees 
to employers. The strategy was carefully pursued, consistent with the Stepping Stones 
approach set out by Thatcher’s advisers in the 1970s and evident at different points in the 
phased conduct of the 1984–5 strike. Potential allies of the striking miners – notably steel 
and dock workers, and miners in the working areas, especially in Nottinghamshire – were 
offered reassurances about the security of their own employment, which they and the 
generality of other workers, including union members, were encouraged to view as 
jeopardized not by government policy but by the NUM action. The government maintained 
employment in these other sectors via a number of mechanisms, including large-scale 
policing to protect key economic units, notably the working mines of Nottinghamshire, and 
BSC works. One of the revealing insights from the CMGC minutes, indeed, is the role of the 
Prime Minister in directing the relief of the siege at Ravenscraig in May 1984, with police 
officers instructed to prevent striking miners from gathering at the plant to force its closure. 
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The extent and character of government intervention is further revealed within the 
CMGC minutes by the government’s micro-management of NCB-NUM negotiations. This 
does represent an important qualification to existing interpretations of the strike. The Prime 
Minister and her colleagues closely monitored these talks and where necessary destabilized 
them, to ensure that there was no meaningful preservation of trade-union voice on the 
high-order strategic issue of pit closures. This was ‘class struggle from above’. Future 
analysis and criticism of NUM strategy and tactics ought to accommodate this valuable 
conclusion. There may have been scope for broadening labour movement mobilization in 
defence of joint industrial regulation, had the NUM leadership been more adroit in 
identifying this as a key issue, along with coal closures, in the strike. But with the 
ascendancy in the 1980s of arguments about the right of management to manage, a more 
explicit defence by the NUM of the right of industrial workers to share in the taking of 
operational and strategic business decisions may have eroded political support for their 
strike among non-union, non-manual and non-working class groups. 
Deindustrialization accelerated after the strike, and the coalfield moral economy was 
dismantled: closures were imposed on the workforce by managerial fiat, with limited 
alternative economic activity and employment. A growing portion of the coalfield 
population became officially classified as ‘permanently sick’, receiving relatively more 
attractive welfare benefits than those officially classified as unemployed. This mitigation of 
deindustrialization’s political and social consequences is further evidence that the 
Conservative government’s prime strategic goal was the upward redistribution of economic 
and power resources rather than the saving of public expenditure or pursuit of economic 
rationalization. Removing unionized workers from the labour market via elevated 
expenditure on social security was a necessary transaction cost for ministers seeking to 
entrench the right of managers to manage. In the same vein the government’s pursuit of 
victory in 1984–5 was clearly not geared solely or even largely to the achievement of greater 
cost efficiencies in the NCB, or to the provision of cheaper electricity for business and 
domestic consumers. The primary government goal, in the coalfields as elsewhere, was the 
elimination of effective union representation and joint industrial regulation. 
 
